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Medicaid, Marketplaces, and
Premium Assistance: What Is at Stake in Arkansas?
The Perils and Pitfalls of Medicaid Expansion Through
Marketplace Premium Assistance
Sidney D. Watson'
ON September 27, 2013, Arkansas became the first state to obtain federalapproval for a Section 1115 demonstration waiver to require adults
eligible for the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) Medicaid Expansion to enroll in
private plans offered through the State's new Health Insurance Marketplace
rather than traditional Medicaid. 2 Hailed as a "game changer," Republican
lawmakers dubbed this Marketplace Premium Assistance approach a new
Medicaid "private option."' Others described it as a potential "middle ground"
in efforts to expand Medicaid that may be more politically palatable for those
who oppose "Obamacare."
States' interest in Marketplace Premium Assistance is part of the post-
NFIB v. Sebelius federalism dance that heated up when the Supreme Court
made the ACAs Medicaid Expansion for adults voluntary for states. The ACA
extends Medicaid to adults under age 65 with incomes at or below 133% of
the federal poverty line, effective January 1, 2014, with full federal funding for
1 Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law Center for Health Law Studies.
Thanks to MaryBeth Musumeci for comments and suggestions on this Article, and her research
and writing about this issue. Thanks also to Nathaniel Carroll, Saint Louis University School of
Law, J.D., 2015 for research help, and to Courtney Thiele, Saint Louis University School of Law,
J.D., 205, and Alixandra HallenJ.D./M.P.H., 20I6, for editorial help. Special thanks to the student
editors at the Kentucky La-wjournal.
2 See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Andy
Allison, Dir., Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivershii5/downloads/ar/ar-private-option-ca.pdf;
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., No. II-W-o0287/6, ARKANSAS HEALTH CARE INDE-
PENDENCE PROGRAM (PRIVATE OPTION): SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS (2013) [hereinafter
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS], http://www.dhhs.nh.gov/sme/documents/arkansasterms-con-
ditions.pdf. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was actually two separate pieces of legislation: the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. ii9 (20zo) (codified in
scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), and the Health Care and Education Act of 20o,
Pub. L. No. 111-152,124 Stat. io29, which amended Public Law 111-148.
3 Div. of Med. Servs., Private Health Insurance for the Medicaid Expansion Population, ARK.
DEPARTMENT OF Hum. SERVICES, http://humanservices.arkansas.gov/dms/Pages/default.aspx
(last updated Aug. S, 2013); David Ramsey, Update. Medicaid Game-Changer, ARK. TIMES: ARK.
BLOG (Feb. 26, 2013,5:07 PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2o13/02/26/med-
icaid-game-changer-feds-approve-putting-entire-expansion-population-on-exchange.
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the first three years and at least 90% funding thereafter.4 However, even with
this generous federal support, HHS must still entice recalcitrant states into
expanding Medicaid. The Secretary of HHS has repeatedly expressed that the
administration is eager to let states find their own ways, and that Section 1115
of the Social Security Act allows the Secretary to waive certain provisions of
the Medicaid Act to allow states to test new and innovative demonstration
programs likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the program.
Arkansas's Section 1115 Premium Assistance demonstration waiver
was conceived in a state with a Democratic governor, who needed the votes
of three-quarters of a Republican controlled legislature to pass enabling
legislation to expand Medicaid.5 The "Arkansas Plan" succeeded in garnering
enough bipartisan support that it passed by one vote and was signed into law
on March 26, 2013.6 Since then, other states with strong two party systems
have proposed their own variants of an "Arkansas Plan." On May 23, 2013,
Iowa, a state with a Republican governor and a Democrat controlled legislature,
became the second state to pass a Medicaid Expansion that relies on mandatory
Marketplace Premium Assistance; and on December 11, 2013 it too obtained
federal approval for a Section 1115 demonstration waiver.' In December 2013,
Pennsylvania, another state with a Republican governor, also filed its own
Section 1115 waiver request seeking to use Marketplace Premium Assistance
as part of a Medicaid Expansion. Other states are likely to follow.'
Premium Assistance is not new to Medicaid, but using it as the avenue
through which the Medicaid Expansion population gets coverage will
dramatically expand its use. Moreover, using Premium Assistance to purchase
individual coverage is relatively uncharted territory. The ACAs reforms of
the individual market and the new Health Insurance Marketplaces create
new opportunities to use Medicaid funds to provide access to private plans.
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 118-148, §2oo(a)(i)(C), 124 Stat.
119, 271 (2010) [hereinafter ACA] (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
5 Ramsey, supra note 3. Legislative leaders sent the Governor to ask HHS if the State could
use an Marketplace-offered private insurance instead of traditional Medicaid. Id. When HHS said
that existing Medicaid rules authorized such an approach, the plan moved forward. Id.
6 See John Lyon, Passage ofHealth Care Expansion Came Down to Teamwork, ARK. NEWS (Apr.
21, 2013), http://arkansasnews.com/sections/news/arkansas/passage-health-care-expansion-came-
down-teamwork.html.
7 See IOWA DEPT OF HUMAN SERVS., IOWA HEALTH AND WELLNESS PLAN (2053), available at
http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/uploads/Iowa%2oHealth%2oand%2oWellness%2oPlan%200verviews.
pdf; Iowa Marketplace Choice Plan, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Special Terms
and Conditions, WASH. PosT, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/files/203/12/
Iowaz.pdf.
8 See Greg Sargent,Another Potential Boostfor Obamacare, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/12/io/another-potential-boost-for-obam-
acare/.
9 See id. (indicating Tennessee is likely to follow); see also Virginia Young, Nixon Makes Push
for Medicaid Changes, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Jan. 1, 2014), http://stltoday.newspaperdirect.comi/
epaper/viewer.aspx (suggesting Missouri is likely to follow).
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However, tying the Medicaid Expansion to the brand new Health Insurance
Marketplace creates potential risks as well as benefits for enrollees, insurance
pools, providers, the health care delivery system, and the public fisc.
Part I of this Article describes the two different approaches the ACA
creates to finance access to affordable insurance coverage: Marketplace plans
subsidized through federal tax credits and the Medicaid Expansion. The ACA
retained and expanded Medicaid as coverage for the nation's poorest in great
part because actuarial analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and
others concluded that it cost less to insure people using Medicaid rather than
with private insurance.o At the same time, creating two tiers of subsidized
insurance, one public and the other private, creates potential disruptions
as personal income fluctuates. This Part discusses why policy experts and
lawmakers are intrigued by the possibilities created by using Marketplace
Premium Assistance, rather than traditional Medicaid, to provide coverage for
those newly eligible for Medicaid.
Part II briefly describes Medicaid's joint federal-state structure,
core mandatory and state option requirements for services and program
administration, and Section 1115 demonstration waivers. It discusses long-
standing federal Medicaid law authorizing Premium Assistance for employer-
sponsored insurance and the use of Section 1115 waivers for Premium
Assistance in that context. It ends with an explanation of how those programs
have evolved, and why they have remained only a miniscule part of overall
Medicaid spending.
Part III examines recently issued regulatory and sub-regulatory guidance
on Premium Assistance for individual policies in general and Marketplace
plans in particular. New federal regulations clarify that states have the option
to offer adults newly eligible under ACA's Medicaid Expansion, and others, the
choice of enrolling in Marketplace plans subsidized by Medicaid funds." In
sub-regulatory guidance HHS has also outlined the conditions under which it
will also consider granting a limited number of state requests for Section 1115
Medicaid waivers to implement mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance
demonstrations that require Medicaid Expansion eligible adults to obtain
coverage through Marketplace plans rather than direct Medicaid coverage.
Part IV examines in more detail Arkansas's new Medicaid Section 1115
Marketplace demonstration waiver in light of this new federal guidance,
and the possibilities and risks created by replacing traditional Medicaid with
Marketplace Premium Assistance. Arkansas has obtained federal approval for
a Section 1115 demonstration waiver that will require Medicaid Expansion
adults, who are not medically frail, to enroll in Marketplace plans.12 Arkansas's
waiver closely tracks the guidance for mandatory Marketplace demonstration
lo See Ramsey, supra note 3.
ni Final Rules on Essential Health Benefits, Exchanges and Eligibility for Medicaid and
CHIP, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160, 42,303 (July 15, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 155, 156).
12 Letter from Marilyn Tavenner to Andy Allison, supra note 2.
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projects outlined by HHS. However, questions remain about what impact the
Arkansas Marketplace demonstration will have on Arkansas'new Marketplace,
on those required to enroll in Marketplace Premium Assistance, and especially
on beneficiaries who will continue to rely on traditional Medicaid. Also still
unanswered is how much this experiment will cost, and how HHS will evaluate
this grand experiment.
I. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES, MEDICAID EXPANSION,
AND FEDERALISM PosT-NFIB
The Affordable Care Act uses a variety of insurance options to guarantee
American citizens and some legal immigrants access to affordable health
insurance." Those who have affordable employer-sponsored insurance keep
it; but, effective 2014, those without affordable employer-sponsored insurance
have new options. Health Insurance Marketplaces offer individuals and small
employers access to insurance plans that provide better coverage and offer
increased financial protections. Pre-existing condition exclusions are outlawed
for adults and premiums no longer vary based upon health status.
Two different programs help make insurance more affordable for low-and
moderate-income individuals and families. Those earning between 100% and
400% of the federal poverty line (FPL) ($11,490 to $45,960 for an individual in
2013) who do not have access to other "minimum creditable coverage" qualify
for new sliding-scale federal tax credits to subsidize the costs of premiums for
individual plans purchased on the Marketplace. 14 Those with incomes between
100% and 250% FPL also qualify for additional federal tax credits to reduce
their out of pocket costs for deductibles, copays, and coinsurance.15 For adults
earning below 133% FPL ($15,282 for an individual and $31,322 for a family
of four in 2013) the ACA creates a Medicaid Expansion to provide new public
insurance coverage."
13 See ACA §§ 1001-1563 (codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
14 ACA § 1401 (codified at I.R.C. § 36 (2012)).
15 BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ & THOMAS GABE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41r37,HEALTH IN-
SURANCE PREMIUM CREDITS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA)
1,12-13 (203). For those eligible for cost-sharing subsidies, the actuarial value of the plan for those
with incomes between oo% and 15o% FPL is increased to 94%; between 151% and 200% FPL it
rises to 87%, and between 201% and 250% FPL it increases to 73%. Id. at i4 -i5.The silver plan has an
actuarial value of 70%. Id. at 15. So the cost-sharing subsidies mean that certain eligible applicants
in silver plans have lower out-of-pocket spending limits and they also pay lower deductibles and
co-payments. Id. at 13.
16 ACA § 2oo(a)(I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a); FERNANDEZ & GABE, supra note 1s, at
9 tbl.2. The Medicaid Expansion for adults covers those ages 18 to 64 who are not Medicare-eli-
gible, pregnant or already covered by a mandatory category of Medicaid eligibility, like low-income
parents or those eligible for SSI. ACA § 200I(a)(I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 396a). A 5% income
disregard in section 1004(e) of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 200 brings
the income cut-off effectively up to 138% FPL. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, § 004(e), 42 U.S.C. § 396a(e)(14) (originally enacted as ACA § 2002(a)) (adding to the So-
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However, the Supreme Court's decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) shifted the political balance of power
for the Medicaid Expansion from the federal government to the states, making
the Medicaid Expansion a state-level decision.17 The Supreme Court held that
the federal government could not compel states to implement the Medicaid
Expansion for adults through the threat of loss of all Medicaid finding." The
Court remedied the constitutional infirmity by holding that the Medicaid
Expansion stood, but as a voluntary option rather than a mandatory requirement
for states.19 Suddenly, a new political and policy debate erupted over whether
states should and would opt to implement the ACA's Medicaid Expansion for
adults. Some states, particularly those with Republican controlled legislatures
or Republican governors, began negotiating with HHS, seeking more state
autonomy to design an ACA-funded Medicaid Expansion for adults.
Section 2001(a) of the ACA, the section at issue in NFIB, creates a new
category of Medicaid eligibility for non-elderly adults with income that "does
not exceed 133[%] of the [federal] poverty line."20 Section 2001(a) also provides
especially generous federal financing for this new adult Medicaid Expansion
category: The federal government pays 100% of the costs from 2014 to 2016,
gradually declining to 90% in 2020 and thereafter.21
The ACA Medicaid Expansion for adults, with its enhanced federal match,
removes a major federal law impediment to Medicaid eligibility: Prior to
the ACA, the federal Medicaid statute only authorized states to cover poor
children, pregnant women, the elderly, people with disabilities, and parents with
dependent children. The statute did not give states the authority to cover adults
who were not parents of dependent children. The only way states could cover
these so-called "childless adults" was by using a Section 1115 demonstration
waiver. However, these waivers require that any expansion in eligibility be done
in a manner that is budget neutral for the federal government, limiting the ability
cial Security Act a provision requiring a 5% income disregard for certain qualified individuals); see
also FERNANDEZ & GABE, supra note 15, at 6 n.27. At least until Sept. 30, 2019, children who are not
covered as dependents remain eligible for CHIP and Medicaid under the same rules that existed
when the ACA was passed. ACA § zooi(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)).
17 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, z633 (2012).
i8 Id. at 2608.
19 Id.
20 See ACA § 200x(a)(i)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § i396a) (expanding coverage to include
previously uncovered individuals) ("[B]eginning January 1, 204, [individuals] who are under 65
years of age, not pregnant, not entitled to, or enrolled for, benefits under part A of title XVIII, or en-
rolled for benefits under part B of title XVIII, and are not described in a previous subclause of this
clause, and whose income (as determined under subsection (e)(14)) does not exceed 133 percent of
the poverty line (as defined in section 211o(c)(5)) applicable to a family of the size involved, subject
to subsection (k)."). Excluded from the AC~s Medicaid Expansion category are non-elderly adults
who are Medicare eligible, pregnant or described in a mandatory category of Medicaid eligibility,
like low-income parents or those eligible for SSI. Id.
21 ACA § 2001(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § s39 6d).
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of states to leverage additional federal dollars to cover the costs of Medicaid
coverage for more low-income adults.22 The ACAs Medicaid Expansion up
to 133% FPL provides statutory authority and new federal match funding to
enable states to cover an estimated 15.1 million additional adults, potentially
expanding the size of the program by almost a quarter.2 1
As the post-NFIB federalism dance began, some states considered
expanding Medicaid for adults but only up to 100% FPL, rather than 133%
FPL, in an effort to shift the insurance costs for adults with incomes between
100% and 133% FPL from Medicaid to the new federal premium tax credits for
Marketplace coverage. States assumed that such a "partial Medicaid expansion"
would save them money because it would allow state Medicaid programs to
cover substantially fewer adults. Of the estimated 15.1 million adults newly
eligible for Medicaid, about 3.6 million, approximately 24%, have incomes
between 100% and 133% FPL.2 4 However, because the ACA's Medicaid
Expansion carries with it such a generous federal match up to 133% FPL, it
actually costs states more to implement a "partial expansion" and insure fewer
adults.
The ACAs enhanced federal matching funds of 100%, and then 90%, are
only available to states that implement Section 2001(a)'s Medicaid Expansion
for all adults earning up to 133% FPL. In December 2012 and again in
March 2013, HHS issued policy guidance confirming that the ACA does not
authorize an enhanced federal match for a Medicaid Expansion that only goes
up to 100% FPL. States may still propose Section 1115 demonstration waivers
for a partial expansion for adults, but demonstrations are funded at the state's
regular federal match rate, 50% to 73.43%, depending on the state's per capita
22 See KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., A LOOK AT SECTION 1115 MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVERS UNDER THE ACA: A
Focus ON CHILDLESS ADULTS (Oct. 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word-
press.cOm/2013/io/8499-a-look-at-section-mii5-medicaid-demonstration-waivers.pdf
23 See Genevieve M. Kenney et al., Opting Out of the Medicaid Expansion under the ACA:
How Many Uninsured Adults Would not Be Eligible for Medicaid, URBAN INST., July 5, 2012, http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/41260 7 -Opting-Out-of-the-Medicaid-Expansion-Under-
the-ACA.pdf. (explaining that the ACA Expansion makes 15.1 million adults new eligible); See
also KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID: A
PRIMER I (2013) [hereinafter MEDICAID PRIMER], http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
COm/2010/o6/ 7334 -05.pdf (describing Medicaid before the ACA Expansion covering about 62 mil-
lion people).
24 See Kenney et al., Opting out ofthe Medicaid Expansion under theACA, supra note 23.
25 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV5., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON EXCHANGES, MARKET REFORMS, AND MEDICAID, 12 (2012)
[hereinafter CMS 2012 FAQs], http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/ex-
changes-faqs-12-O-2I12.pdf, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP7T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE AcT: PREMIUM ASSISTANCE I (2013)
[hereinafter CMS 2013 FAQs], available at http://medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/Down-
loads/FAQ-o3-29-I3-Premium-Assistance.pdf.
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income.26 It actually costs states more to opt for a partial expansion only to
100% FPL than to take advantage of the ACAs Medicaid Expansion with its
enhanced federal match.27
Even as states' interest in a partial Medicaid Expansion waned, that
conversation sparked broader interest in using Marketplace plans to cover
adults eligible for the ACA's Medicaid Expansion. Health policy experts had
already identified several potential benefits of using Marketplace plans to cover
Medicaid enrollees.28 For Medicaid beneficiaries, enrolling in Marketplace
plans could reduce some of the potential disruptions that come from the ACAs
use of multiple types of insurance, called "churning."2 9 Churning occurs when
people's incomes fluctuate and they move back and forth between Medicaid and
Marketplace tax credit eligibility, potentially having to change insurance plans
and provider networks.30 Researchers have estimated that 28 million Americans
annually-almost 35% percent of those eligible for new affordability support-
are likely to churn across the 133% FPL Medicaid-Marketplace divide each
year.31
Buying Marketplace plans with Medicaid funds might shield families from
the impact of small income changes since they could keep their Marketplace
plans and providers regardless of whether Medicaid or federal tax credits were
paying the premiums at any given moment. Researchers estimate that using
Medicaid to purchase Marketplace plans could reduce churning by as much as
two-thirds, to only about 10% per year in states like Arkansas that presently
have highly restrictive eligibility for adults, and about 15% per year in states
26 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE
(FIMAP) FOR MEDICAID AND MULTIPLIER, http://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-
matching-rate-and-multiplier/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2014); see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., How WILL THE UNINSURED FARE IN WISCONSIN UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
(Jan. 6, 2014) http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/state-profiles-uninsured-under-aca-wis-
consin/.
27 CMS 2012 FAQs, supra note 25, at 12.
28 For an excellent discussion of the potential risks and benefits of Marketplace Premium
Assistance, see generally KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PREMIUM ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAID AND CHIP: AN OVERVIEW OF
CURRENT OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2013) [hereinafter
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAID AND CHIP], http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
Com/2013/03/8 4 22.pdf
29 Id. at 8.
30 For example, a family may have one parent with employer-sponsored insurance, a second
parent with Medicaid coverage, and children covered by the Children's Health Insurance Program
(CHIP). If Medicaid and CHIP could pay the premiums for the employer-sponsored or Market-
place plan insurance, then the whole family would be able to enroll in the same insurance plan.
31 Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health Insurance
- 7he Great New Experiment?, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (2013); Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara
Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth
Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 HEALTH AFF. 228, 232 (2011).
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like Ohio that offer more generous coverage.32 Of course, this assumes that
states can create a process by which people moving from Marketplace Premium
Assistance to federal tax credits could stay in the same plan and provider
networks, requiring close coordination between Medicaid coverage and the
Marketplace.
Enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries in Marketplace plans might also give
them access to more robust provider networks. One perennial concern about
Medicaid is that only about 70% of physicians accept new Medicaid patients.3
While Medicaid enrollees report similar access to care as privately insured
patients, Medicaid beneficiaries have traditionally had a different choice of
physicians than those with private insurance. Medicaid patients rely more
heavily on a smaller group of safety net providers, for example, federally
qualified health centers (FQHCs), as their source of primary care.34 Using
private plans for Medicaid should both address physicians' concerns that
Medicaid payment rates are typically lower than private rates and effectively
"mainstream" Medicaid beneficiaries into the delivery system serving privately
insured patients.3 s It should also alleviate states' concerns about whether their
existing Medicaid fee-for-service and managed care programs have enough
capacity to absorb the 37.4% increase in Medicaid enrollment, an increase of
18.1 million children and adults if all states expand, which is anticipated after
full implementation all the ACA changes, including the Medicaid Expansion. 6
Moving adults that are newly eligible for Medicaid into Marketplace
plans could also strengthen the new Marketplaces, benefiting all those in the
individual market as well as the federal government, which funds the new
tax credits. Moving Medicaid Expansion adults into Marketplace coverage
could more than double the size of the Marketplace pool in the short run, and
increase the size of the pool by as much as 75% in the long run." These larger
32 See Rosenbaum & Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health Insurance -The Great
New Experiment? supra note 31, at 8-9.
33 Sandra L. Decker, Two-Thirds ofPrimary Care Physicians AcceptedNew Medicaid Patients in
20H1-12:A Baseline to Measure Future Acceptance Rates, 32 HEALTH AFF. n83, 1184-85 (2013).
34 See MEDICAID PRIMER, supra note 23, at q, see also Sidney D. Watson, Section If7 oftheAf-
fordable Care Act: CivilRights, Health Reform, Race and Equity,55 How. L.J. 855,857, 867 n.76 (2012).
35 See PeterJ. Cunningham, Ctr. for Studying Health Sys. Change, Physician Reimbursement
and Participation in Medicaid 2 (Sept. 23, 2oo), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/ii 57 /iI 57
pdf (testimony comparing Medicaid and private pay physician payment rates and cataloguing the
reasons physicians give for refusing to accept Medicaid). The ACA also addresses concerns about
physician reimbursement rates by providing for an increase in Medicaid primary care physician
payments to Medicare rates for 2013 and 2014, dramatically increasing primary are rates. See MED-
ICAID PRIMER, supra note 23, at 23-24.
36 See GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATE AND
LOcAL COVERAGE CHANGES UNDER FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
1-3 (2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2or 3/o 7/844 3 -state-and-
local--coverage-changes-under-fill-implementation.pdf.
37 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO- 43 47 2, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE AcT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DE-
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numbers could make the Marketplaces more attractive for private insurers,
increasing insurance competition, and potentially lowering premium costs for
both individuals and the federal government.
However, an influx of lower income people into the Marketplace could also
increase prices in the Marketplace. Lower income people tend to be less healthy
than those who earn more, which means they are more costly to insure." The
CBO estimates that Marketplace premiums will be 2% higher if there is an
influx into the Marketplaces of people earning between 100% and 133% FPL."
A study by the Rand Corporation concludes that Marketplace rates will be
between 8% and 10% higher in Texas, Louisiana, and Florida, because those
states are not expanding Medicaid in 2014, and people earning between 100%
and 133% FPL will be purchasing Marketplace plans.40 A Medicaid strategy
to move those with incomes below 100% FPL, as well as those with incomes
between 100% and 133% FPL, into the Marketplaces could raise Marketplace
premiums even higher.
Moving people from Medicaid to Marketplace Premium Assistance also
carries risks for enrollees. Marketplace plans provide different coverage, have
higher premiums, and have fewer cost-sharing protections for enrollees. Many
lawmakers like this aspect of Marketplace Premium Assistance because they
believe lower income families should have more "skin in the game" and should
not have more generous coverage than moderate income Americans. However,
two decades of research indicate that the typical private insurance plan leaves
a low income family with higher out of pocket costs that creates barriers to
appropriate care and places them at financial risk when illness strikes.The CBO
also estimates that the higher premiums and cost sharing for Marketplace plans
will create barriers to enrollment, resulting in lower enrollment in Marketplace
plans compared to Medicaid and higher rates of uninsurance. 41
For conservative state lawmakers, private Marketplace plans offer a
more politically palatable insurance option than a public insurance program
like Medicaid. These legislators began talking about Marketplace Premium
Assistance as a new Medicaid "private option." While this rhetoric may be
attractive in the political arena, it can be hard for health policy experts to
square with the reality of how state Medicaid programs actually deliver service.
Most non-disabled adult Medicaid beneficiaries are already covered by private
aISIoN 15, 18 tbl.x (2012) [hereinafter CBO ESTIMATES 20I2], http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/4 3 472-0 7-24--2oI2-CoverageEstimates.pdf (March 2012 baseline shows
numbers of people likely eligible for and likely to enroll in Medicaid and Marketplace coverage if
all states enact Medicaid Expansion).The increase in Marketplace size will vary by state according
to whether its present Medicaid eligibility for adults is generous or stingy. Id. at to.
38 See id. at 15.
39 See id.
40 Christine Eibner et al., The Affordable Care Act and Health Insurance Markets: Simulating
the Effects of Regulation, RAND CORP., 2013, at vii, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
research_reports/RRioo/RRi8 9/RANDRRi8 9 .pdf.
41 Id. at 14.
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plans. About half of Medicaid beneficiaries nationwide are enrolled in private
Medicaid managed care plans. 42 Medicaid already has a very extensive "private
option."
Yet the biggest obstacle to Marketplace Premium Assistance is cost.
Congress included a Medicaid Expansion in the ACA extending eligibility for
adults up to 133% FPL in part because this Medicaid Expansion, even when
funded 100% with federal dollars, costs the federal government less money
than federal premium tax credits for private insurance. Medicaid costs less per
person than private plans, primarily because Medicaid pays providers less and
has lower administrative costs. 43 The CBO estimates that it will cost about 33%
more to cover people using Marketplace plans rather than Medicaid, about
$9000 per person for Marketplace plans compared to $6000 per person for
Medicaid coverage.44
Thus, Marketplace Premium Assistance offers interesting possibilities but
also carries risks for enrollees, Marketplace premium rates, and the public fisc.
In assessing the risk-benefit ratio it is important to understand the differences
between Premium Assistance and direct Medicaid coverage, the protections
available to the Medicaid beneficiaries, and the role that the Medicaid state
agency plays in assuring access, quality and cost effectiveness. It is also helpful
to understand the history of Medicaid Premium Assistance for employer-
sponsored coverage.
II. A LOOK BACK: MEDICAID AND PREMIUM AssIsTANCE FOR
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED INSURANCE
Medicaid is a joint federal-state entitlement program that provides open-
ended federal financial assistance to states operating an approved Medicaid
state plan. 45 As a federal-state partnership, each state designs and operates its
own Medicaid program within broad federal guidelines. Federal law outlines
core "mandatory" state plan requirements that state Medicaid programs must
comply with for eligibility, covered services, and program administration, but
states retain considerable flexibility to cover additional "optional" categories
of eligibility, services, and administration." 'Those who qualify for Medicaid
coverage have a legal entitlement to receive all medically necessary services,
both mandatory and optional, provided for in the Medicaid state plan.47
42 KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: KEY DATA, TRENDS, AND ISSUES 1-2 (2012), http://kaiser-
familyfoundation.files.wordpress.coml/20z3/o/80 4 6-02.pdf.
43 CBO ESTIMATES 2012, supra note 37, at I6.
44 Id. at 15-16. (based on estimates of 2022 premium costs)
45 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2012).
46 See id. §§ i396a, 139 6d (2012).
47 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396--396v (2012).
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States may also seek "waivers" from the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to use federal Medicaid funds in ways not otherwise authorized by the
federal statute and regulations. 41 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives
the Secretary of HHS authority to waive specific provisions of the Medicaid
Act to allow research and demonstration projects to test new approaches to
program design and administration.49 Although not required by statute or
regulation, under longstanding administrative policy, Section 1115 waivers
must be budget neutral for the federal government. This means that federal
spending under a waiver must not be more than projected federal spending
would have been for that state without the waiver. States have used Section
1115 waivers to expand eligibility, alter benefits and experiment with new
delivery system designs.s0
While states have great flexibility in defining their Medicaid benefit packages,
federal law requires that Medicaid state plans cover a set of"mandatory" services
some of which are typically not covered by private insurance, like nursing home
care, Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) for children,
federally qualified health centers (FQHC) services, and expansive family
planning services.s Medicaid's EPSDT package for children under age 21 is
the country's most comprehensive preventive health and treatment program
for children.52 Coverage for FQHC services recognizes the special role these
providers play in providing primary care to low-income communities and helps
support the services they provide to the uninsured." State Medicaid programs
are also required to cover non-emergency transportation to and from necessary
medical care, a benefit that helps alleviate one of the biggest barriers to care for
low-income individuals and families.54
Generally, states must cover the same Medicaid benefits for all enrollees
statewide, but adults eligible for the new ACA Medicaid Expansion who
48 Section x1x5 of the Social Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services
broad authority to waive statutory and regulatory provisions of health and welfare programs, like
Medicaid. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 1115, 49 Stat. 690 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § I3I5(a) (202)). Section 1915(c) of the Act gives the Secretary authority to waive statu-
tory and regulatory provisions to operate home and community based long-term care programs.
See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74 -271, § 1915(c), 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396n (2012)). States can also obtain waivers to expand managed care programs under Section
1915(b) waivers. Id.
49 See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 1115, 49 Stat. 690 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § I35(a) (2012)).
so See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION III1 MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVER AcTIvrrY (2012),
available at http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/an-overview-of-recent-section-i5-medicaid/.
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(io)(A)(i) (listing Medicaid mandatory services) and 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(io)(A)(ii) (listing Mediciaid optional servies). For a more accessible explanation of Med-
icaid mandatory and optional services, see MEDICAID PRIMER, supra note 23.
52 MEDICAID PRIMER, Supra note 23.
53 Id.
54 Id
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are not medically frail or have other special medical needs are entitled to an
"Alternative Benefit Plan" (ABP) which states can benchmark more closely to
private insurance coverage, excluding at state option some otherwise mandatory
services, most significantly nursing home care." However, state ABPs must still
cover certain mandatory services including medically necessary transportation,
EPSDT benefits for those under age twenty-one, FQHC services, and family
planning services.s6 While states have the flexibility to specify different ABPs
for different groups of newly eligible adults, all ABPs must cover the ten
essential health benefits now required for individual and small group private
insurance including, among other services, preventive care, rehabilitative and
habilitative services, and mental health." Moreover, ACA eligible adults who
are medically frail or have special health needs remain entitled, at their option,
to an ABP that includes all mandatory and optional services covered by the
state plan assuring that those who have more extensive medical care needs have
access to the state's full Medicaid benefits package, especially nursing home and
other long term care services.ss
Federal Medicaid law also restricts states' ability to impose premiums and
cost sharing. Premiums are prohibited for children and adults with incomes at
or below 150% FPL. 9 Cost sharing-deductibles, copays, and coinsurance-is
prohibited altogether for some groups and limited to "nominal" amounts for
adults with incomes below poverty." Most children and adults with incomes
between 100% and 150% FPL can be charged higher cost sharing, but for
all Medicaid beneficiaries the total amount of premiums and cost-sharing is
capped at 5% of monthly or quarterly income."
While Medicaid is a public insurance program, Medicaid beneficiaries,
like other Americans, receive their care primarily through private providers
and private health plans. Some states pay for services on a fee-for-service
basis with the state Medicaid program paying hospitals, doctors, and other
providers directly for each service. In other states, Medicaid beneficiaries
receive all or part of their care through insurance companies, called Managed
55 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.315,440.350 (2013).
56 42 C.F.R. § 440-345 (2013).
57 42 C.F.R. § 440.347 (2013).
58 45 C.F.R. § 440.315 (203). State definitions of those who are medically frail must, at a
minimum, include individuals with disabling mental disorders (including children with serious
emotional disturbances and adults with serious mental illness); individuals with chronic substance
use disorders; individuals with serious and complex medical conditions; individuals with a physical,
intellectual, or developmental disability that significantly impairs their ability to perform one or
more activities of daily living; or individuals with a disability determination based on Social Secu-
rity criteria or in States that apply more restrictive criteria than the Supplemental Security Income
program (the State plan criteria). Id.
59 42 U.S.C. § 53960 and §s396o-i. HHS recently recodified the federal regulations on premi-
ums and cost sharing. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.15-44756 (2013)
60 42 U.S.C. § 44756
61 42 U.S.C. § 447.56(f)
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Care Organizations (MCOs) in Medicaid. MCOs are paid a monthly
premium-called a capitation rate-for each enrolled beneficiary and assume
the financial risk for providing a defined set of benefits. Most states operate their
Medicaid programs using some combination of these and other approaches. 62
Within this federal-state structure, Premium Assistance is a long-
standing Medicaid state option that has allowed states to use Medicaid funds
to subsidize the purchase of employer-sponsored insurance. 63 One potential
benefit of using Premium Assistance for employer-sponsored insurance is
cost savings: If employer premium contributions are generous enough, then
employer-sponsored coverage may cost the federal and state governments less
than traditional Medicaid.64 Employer-sponsored family coverage can also
provide a vehicle for expanding coverage to family members not eligible for
traditional Medicaid.
However, Premium Assistance for employer-sponsored private insurance
also raises concerns because private insurance typically does not cover long
term care, EPSDT, FQHC services, extensive family planning, or medically
necessary transportation that are part of the traditional Medicaid benefit
package. Employer-sponsored coverage also often has higher enrollee premiums
and cost sharing than traditional Medicaid. 6s
To address these concerns, statutory authorization for Premium Assistance
for employer-sponsored plans specifies that those enrolled in Premium
Assistance remain Medicaid beneficiaries entitled to all Medicaid services,
cost sharing, and other protections.6 6 'Ihe private employer plan and Medicaid
operate together as two sources of insurance: The private health plan becomes
the primary payer for benefits and services it covers, with the state Medicaid
program legally obligated to have mechanisms in place to provide "wrap-around"
services to supplement the private insurance to the extent that private benefits are
less or cost-sharing obligations are greater than traditional Medicaid. Premium
Assistance enrollees get services covered by their employer-sponsored plan
through that plan, then Medicaid pays for long term care, medically necessary
transportation, EPSDT, and other services covered only by Medicaid. Medicaid
also pays any employer-sponsored plan deductibles, copays, or coinsurance that
exceed those allowed by Medicaid.
62 MEDICAID PRIMER, Supra note 23, at 16.
63 U.S. GovT AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-io-258R, MEDICAID AND CHIP: ENROLL-
MENT, BENEFITS AND EXPENDITURES, AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PREMIUM As-
SISTANCE PROGRAMS I (20oo) [hereinafter GAO MEDICAID AND CHIP], http://www.gao.gov/
assets/ioo/965i8.pdf.
64 Id. at 2.
65 This article focuses on Medicaid coverage, so will focus solely on Medicaid programs and
law. However, the Childrens Health Insurance Program (CHIP) also authorizes states to use
CHIP funds for Premium Assistance. Id. For more on CHIP Premium Assistance, see id.
66 Id. at so. Section 1906 authorizes HIPP programs to pay premiums for Medicaid-eligible
individuals and, in some cases, their family members who are not Medicaid-eligible.
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Since 1990, Section 1906 of the Social Security Act has authorized state
Medicaid programs to operate Health Insurance Premium Payment (HIPP)
programs that pay premiums for group health plans, primarily employer-
sponsored plans.67 Under the Section 1906 option, if private group coverage
is deemed cost-effective, Medicaid beneficiaries may be required to enroll in
employer-sponsored coverage using Premium Assistance. However, Section
1906 beneficiaries remain entitled to all Medicaid benefits and cost-sharing
protections provided by the state's Medicaid plan. If private coverage offers less
generous benefits or higher cost sharing than Medicaid, states are required to
provide wrap-around Medicaid benefits so that Premium Assistance enrollees
receive the same benefits and cost-sharing protections as other Medicaid
beneficiaries. 61
In 2009, Congress created a new Section 1906A, giving states another
option to use Premium Assistance to pay for employer-sponsored insurance for
parents and children.6 9 Section 1 906A requires that employers contribute at least
40% toward premium costs and, unlike Section 1906, requires that individuals
be given the choice of traditional Medicaid or Premium Assistance.70 As with
the Section 1906 option, Section 1906A Premium Assistance must be cost-
effective, and beneficiaries are entitled to the full Medicaid benefit package and
cost-sharing protections." Beginning January 1, 2014, the ACA gives states
the option to offer Section 1906A Premium Assistance to all Medicaid-eligible
individuals.7 2
The ACA adds new statutory provisions specifying how cost effectiveness
is calculated for both Sections 1906 and 1906A. For both sections, cost-
effectiveness must now take into account the cost of providing wrap-
around services and cost-sharing protections, and the administrative
costs of running the Premium Assistance option.7 1 States had been using
67 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. tox-508, tit. IV, § 44o2(a)(2), 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-161 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e(a) (2012)) (adding § 1906 to the Social
Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620).
68 ACA § o20 3 (b)(I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e(a)(3)).
69 Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, tit.
XIX, § 3o(b), 123 Stat. 8, 61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e-i) (adding § 19o6A to the
Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620).
70 ACA §§ 2003(a), (b), r0203 (b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § s3 9 6e-i(b)(i)(B), (d)(2)).
71 ACA §§ 2003(a), (b), 1o20 3 (b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e-I(a), (e)). States are also
prohibited from using section 19o6A to subsidize high deductible policies, health flexible spending
accounts, or coverage in the individual market. Id. §§ 2003(a), (b), I0203 (b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 396e-I(b)(2)).
72 ACA §§ 2003(a)(i), 1o20 3(b)(2)(B) (Section 2003(a)(i) reads as if this is a mandatory state
requirement, but section 1020 3 (b)(2)(B) declares this requirement null and void thus rendering it
an option) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e-i).
73 ACA § Iozo3(b)(i) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e(e)(2)). For more details on the statutory
language and administrative interpretation, see PREMIUM ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAID AND CHIP,
484 [ VOL.1o2
WHAT IS AT STAKE IN ARKANSAS?
different methods for calculating cost effectiveness, making it hard to
compare programs and impossible to determine whether these Premium
Assistance programs were cost-effective compared to direct Medicaid. 74
Prior to 2010 and the ACA's Medicaid Expansion for adults, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) also approved sixteen Section 1115
demonstration waivers allowing states to use Premium Assistance programs to
expand Medicaid to adults, including childless adults, not otherwise eligible
for coverage.7 5 Subject to the budget neutrality requirements for Section 1115
demonstration waivers, some of these demonstrations authorized states to
experiment with Premium Assistance that provided fewer benefits and higher
cost sharing than traditional Medicaid as a way of offering expanded eligibility
within federal budget constraints. 76 Twelve of these sixteen Premium Assistance
demonstrations provided only partial or no wrap-around Medicaid benefits.77
Most state Medicaid programs now use Premium Assistance for employer-
sponsored coverage. In 2009, thirty-nine states operated such programs, with
Section 1906 HIPP programs being the most popular." States have used
Premium Assistance to target a wide variety of eligibility groups, but programs
have tended to focus on more expensive individuals, such as pregnant women
and children with disabilities, where leveraging job-based coverage is more
likely to be cost-effective.79
Yet, in 2009 Premium Assistance enrollees accounted for only about one
percent of Medicaid spending. 0 Premium Assistance for employer-sponsored
insurance has proved hard to implement because not only has employer-
sponsored insurance become less common generally, but low-wage workers
are less likely than others to be offered employer-sponsored insurance.s" States
have also had a hard time figuring out which services various private plans
covered to be able to determine the necessary wrap-around services and cost
effectiveness.
It is also hard to judge how well Premium Assistance for job-based coverage
works because states have not generally collected data on access and quality
for those enrolled in Premium Assistance.82 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
the biggest challenge is that individuals may not be aware of their rights to
supra note 26, at 5.
74 GAO MEDICAID AND CHIP, supra note 63, at io-ni.
75 Id. at 7.
76 Id. at 6-7.
77 Id. at 9.
78 Id. at 13-16.
79 PREMIUM ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAID AND CHIP, supra note 28, at 7.
8o Id. at 6.
81 GAO MEDICAID AND CHIP, supra note 63, at i.
82 See id. at 9. In a GAO survey of 45 Premium Assistance programs, thirty-four did not
monitor access to care or utilization of services. Id. Of the remaining eleven programs, seven moni-
tored utilizations, three monitored utilization and access, and one program did not report. Id.
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Medicaid wrap-around benefits and cost-sharing protections to supplement
their employer-sponsored insurance. Advocates complain that those enrolled
in Premium Assistance do not receive the full scope of Medicaid benefits
to which they are entitled, losing access to services like medically necessary
transportation, long-term care, and EPSDT for children. 3 However, without
data it is impossible to determine how well these employer-sponsored Premium
Assistance programs do in providing access to services or improving health
status compared to direct Medicaid coverage.
III. MEDICAID PREMIUM ASSISTANCE, MARKETPLACE PLANS, AND
MEDICAID EXPANSION
In 2009, when Congress expanded options for Premium Assistance in
the employer-sponsored market, Congress intentionally moved away from
using Medicaid funds to subsidize purchase of individual plans because
high administrative costs and poor coverage made the individual market
unattractive.84 However, effective 2013, the ACAs individual market reforms
and new Marketplaces make individual plans more attractive, and Premium
Assistance for individual plans easier to administer. As the Medicaid Expansion
debate focused attention on the new Marketplaces as a coverage alternative,
HHS issued new policy guidance on Premium Assistance in the individual
market.
In December 2012, in a set of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about
Marketplaces, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, HHS indicated that it had
concluded that Section 1905(a) of the Social Security Act provides statutory
authority for states to use Medicaid funds for Premium Assistance for individual
plans, including Marketplace plans.ss Most states and health policy experts were
unaware or only vaguely aware of this long-standing provision.86 Nevertheless,
according to a 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on
Premium Assistance, six states had been using Section 1905(a)'s little-known
statutory authority to subsidize Medicaid coverage in the individual market."
Section 1905(a)(29) authorizes state Medicaid programs to pay for "other
insurance premiums for medical or any other type of remedial care or the cost
thereof."ss'Ihe provision is obscure, challenging to locate, and almost impossible
83 PREMIUM ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAID AND CHIP, supra note 28, at 9.
84 Joan Alker, Is There a New Premium Assistance Option in the Air?, SAY AHHH! A HEALTH
CARE POLICY BLOG (Feb. 8, 2013), http://ccf.georgetown.edu/all/is-there-a-new-premium-assis-
tance-option-in-the-air/. In 2009, twenty-one states subsidized policies purchased in the indi-
vidual market, mostly through demonstration waivers. See GAO MEDICAID AND CHIP, supra note
63, at 7--i8.
85 CMS 2012 FAQs, supra note 25, at 7.
86 See Alker, supra note 84.
87 GAO MEDICAID AND CHIP, supra note 63, at :5-16.
88 Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § i3 9 6d(a)(29 ) (2012).
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to decipher because of its tortured use of the English language." Nevertheless,
CMS concluded that Section 1905(a) gives states authority to use Medicaid to
pay private insurance premiums.9 0
However, Section 1905(a) provides little guidance on the parameters
for using Premium Assistance in the individual market generally or for new
Marketplace plans in particular. 'Ihe statute does not specify whether Section
1905(a) Premium Assistance is subject to the same or similar requirements
as Section 1906 and Section 1906A Premium Assistance for employer-
sponsored plans with regard to issues like voluntariness, wrap-around benefits,
cost-sharing protections, and cost effectiveness. The lack of guidance persisted
because HHS had never issued regulatory guidance for Section 1905(a). It was
an orphaned provision.
In January 2013, a few months before Arkansas announced an agreement in
principle with HHS on the use of Premium Assistance to purchase Marketplace
plans, HHS issued proposed regulations for a state option to use Section 1905(a)
Premium Assistance for individual plans.91 Final regulations were promulgated
July 15,2013.92 In the preamble to the final regulations HHS makes clear that
89 42 U.S.C. § 139 6d(a)(2 9 ) reads:
[A]ny other medical care, and any other type of remedial care recognized under State
law, specified by the Secretary, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (16), such
term does not include-
(A) any such payments with respect to care or services for any individual who is an
inmate of a public institution (except as a patient in a medical institution); or
(B) any such payments with respect to care or services for any individual who has not
attained 65 years of age and who is a patient in an institution for mental diseases.
For purposes of clause (vi) of the preceding sentence, a person shall be considered
essential to another individual if such person is the spouse of and is living with such
individual, the needs of such person are taken into account in determining the amount
of aid or assistance furnished to such individual (under a State plan approved under
subchapter I, X, XIV, or XVI of this chapter), and such person is determined, under
such a State plan, to be essential to the well-being of such individual. The payment
described in the first sentence may include expenditures for [Miedicare cost-sharing
and for premiums under part B of subchapter XVIII of this chapter for individuals
who are eligible for medical assistance under the plan and (A) are receiving aid or
assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapters I, X, XIV, or
XVI of this chapter, or part A of subchapter IV of this chapter, or with respect to
whom supplemental security income benefits are being paid under subchapter XVI
of this chapter, or (B) with respect to whom there is being paid a State supplementary
payment and are eligible for medical assistance equal in amount, duration, and scope
to the medical assistance made available to individuals described in section 1396a(a)
(io)(A) of this title, and, except in the case of individuals 65 years of age or older and
disabled individuals entitled to health insurance benefits under subchapter XVIII of
this chapter who are not enrolled under part B of subchapter XVIII of this chapter,
other insurance premiums for medical or any other type of remedial care or the cost thereof
No service (including counseling) shall be excluded from the definition of "medical
assistance" solely because it is provided as a treatment service for alcoholism or drug
dependency.
Id. (emphasis added).
90 See CMS 2012 FAQs, supra note 25, at 17
91 Medicaid, CHIP, and Exchanges, 78 Fed. Reg. 4594, 4624 (Jan. 22, 20x3) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 430,431,433,435,440, 447,457 and 45 C.F.R. Pt. 155)-
92 Final Rule on Essential Health Benefits, Exchanges, and Eligibility for Medicaid and
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its purpose in promulgating these regulations is "to support enrollment of
individuals eligible for Medicaid in plans in the individual market, including
enrollment in" Marketplace plans." In developing regulatory guidance for
Section 1905(a) individual market Premium Assistance, HHS closely tracked
the provisions in Sections 1906 and 1906A for employer-sponsored Premium
Assistance that had evolved from experience over the last twenty years.
The preamble to the Section 1905(a) regulations emphasizes that under
all state option Premium Assistance arrangements, including Section 1905(a),
individuals remain Medicaid beneficiaries entitled to the full range of statutory
protections. 94 Medicaid-eligible individuals who obtain Marketplace plans
through Section 1905(a) Premium Assistance are entitled to all Medicaid
benefits and cost-sharing protections." States must assure that wrap-around
services are available to the extent that Marketplace plans offer fewer benefits
or more cost sharing than the state Medicaid plan.
Because Section 1905(a) does not make enrollment in individual market
coverage a statutory condition for eligibility, HHS concluded that states do not
have the option to require enrollment in Marketplace Premium Assistance as
a condition for receiving Medicaid benefits. 96 The regulations require that state
option Premium Assistance for plans in the individual market be voluntary,
and individuals must be given a choice of Medicaid via Premium Assistance or
direct Medicaid coverage.97
The regulations also impose a cost-effectiveness test for Section 1905(a)
that is consistent with that used in Sections 1906 and 1906A.9 ' The costs of
Premium Assistance for individual plans must be "comparable to the cost
of providing direct coverage under the State plan," taking into account not
only premiums, but also wrap-around benefits, cost-sharing protections, and
administrative costs.9 9
In the preamble to the final regulations, HHS also noted that it would
consider approving a "limited number" of Section 1115 demonstration
waivers for Marketplace Premium Assistance, which could require mandatory
enrollment in Marketplace plans.' 0 HHS specified that these demonstrations
CHIP,78 Fed. Reg. 42,16o, 42,303 (July 15, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.FR. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438,
440,447,457 and 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 156).
93 Id. at 42,184.
94 Id. at 42,184, 42,186.
95 Id. at 42,303; see 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015 (2013).
96 Final Rule on Essential Health Benefits, Exchanges, and Eligibility for Medicaid and
CHIP, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,85.
97 Id. at 42,304; see 42 C.RR. § 4 3 5.rors(b) (2013).
98 Final Rule on Essential Health Benefits, Exchanges, and Eligibility for Medicaid and
CHIP, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,184-85.
99 Id. at 42,304; see 42 C.ER. § 435.io5(a)(4) (2013).
oo Final Rule on Essential Health Benefits, Exchanges, and Eligibility for Medicaid and
CHIP, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,186.
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must meet the Section 1115 statutory requirement that they "further the
objectives of the Medicaid program," indicating it was interested in these
demonstrations because they could help inform policy for new State
Innovation Waivers created by the ACA and authorized to begin in 2017.101
In March 2013, HHS released a set of FAQs that outlines the standards it
intends to use in evaluating applications for Section 1115 demonstration waivers
for mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance.'02The FAQ specifyyet again,
that mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance demonstration enrollees, like
other Premium Assistance enrollees, remain Medicaid beneficiaries entitled to
wrap-around services for Medicaid benefits and cost-sharing protections not
provided by Marketplace plans.103 Those enrolled in mandatory Marketplace
Premium Assistance demonstrations must be given a choice of at least two
Marketplace plans.' Such demonstrations must end no later than December
31, 2016-before the start date for State Innovation Waivers.'
The HHS guidance states that the agency will only consider approving
mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance demonstrations for individuals
required to enroll in a Medicaid Alternative Benefit Plan (ABP) "whose benefits
are closely aligned with benefits available on the Marketplace." 0 6 Limiting
mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance demonstrations to ABPs that are
closely aligned with Marketplace plan benefits reduces the need for Medicaid
wrap-around services. All Medicaid ABPs must cover certain services, like
medically necessary transportation, EPSDT for those under age twenty-one,
FQHC services, and out-of-network family planning that are not covered by
Marketplace plans, these services should be relatively easy to provide via wrap-
around arrangements. The HHS guidance also notes that limiting mandatory
Marketplace Premium Assistance demonstration waivers to those required to
enroll in ABPs prevents a large influx of medically frail and disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries into the Marketplace that could adversely affect premiums for all
Marketplace enrollees. 0 7
Moreover, limiting mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance
demonstrations to individuals required to enroll in a Medicaid ABP closely
aligned to the Marketplace means that HHS intends to approve only
demonstrations that are limited to adults in the new Medicaid Expansion
group who are not medically frail or have other special medical needs.' Newly
loi Id
102 CMS 2013 FAQs, supra note 25, at r- 2.
103 See id at 2.
104 Id
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2.
107 See id. ("Marketplace plans were not designed to offer broader benefits and could experi-
ence unexpected adverse selection due to enrollment of groups that are described in SSA 1937(a)
(2)(B).")
108 Id at 2; see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (explaining mandatory and optional
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eligible adults who are medically frail or have other special health needs are
entitled to the option of enrolling in an ABP that covers all mandatory and
optional services provided by the state plan, including nursing home and long
term care services, benefits that do not align with those covered by Marketplace
plans.'" Those who qualify as children, pregnant women, low-income parents,
or based on disability are exempt from ABP coverage, being entitled to all
benefits covered by the state plan.
The HHS guidance provides that the state must"[m]ake arrangements with
the [Marketplace plans] to provide any necessary wrap-around benefits and cost
sharing.""'o Apparently, the HHS guidance seeks to encourage demonstration
waiver proposals in which wrap-around benefits and cost-sharing protections
are provided by the private health plan through payment of a supplement
premium or other mechanism. As HHS points out, this requirement should
ensure that coverage is seamless, cost-sharing reductions are actually delivered,
and there is accountability to ensure that beneficiaries receive the full Medicaid
package to which they are entitled."' However, it is also interesting that HHS
declined to impose this as a regulatory requirement on states opting to use
Section 1905(a)(29) for non-mandatory Premium Assistance.112
As with all demonstration waivers, mandatory Marketplace Premium
Assistance demonstrations must "promote the objectives of the Medicaid
program" and be budget neutral.113 For these demonstrations, HHS states it is
willing to consider taking into account new factors that might reduce federal
costs for the new Health Insurance Marketplaces, like cost savings from reduced
churning between Medicaid and Premium Assistance and lower Marketplace
premiums that might be created by the addition of new Premium Assistance
enrollees into the Marketplace.1 14
HHS also advised states that the agency is particularly interested in
demonstrations targeting those in the new adult group with income between
100% and 133% FPL, the group of those Medicaid Expansion eligible that
originally prompted states' interest."' HHS's rationale tracks the reasons that
states and policy makers were attracted to Marketplace Premium Assistance
originally: Medicaid allows for additional cost sharing for those above 100%
FPL, this group is more likely to move between Medicaid and Marketplace
benefits and how ABPs differ).
io9 Id.
no Id.
us Id.
112 Final Rule on Essential Health Benefits, Exchanges, and Eligibility for Medicaid and
CHIP, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160, 42,184 (July S, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.R. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438,
440,447,457 and 45 CER. pts. 155, 156).
113 CMS 20I3 FAQs, supra note 25, at 1-2.
114 Id. at 2.
115 Id.
[ VOL.1o2490
WHAT IS AT STAKE IN ARKANSAS?
plans, and this group is eligible for federal tax credits if the state does not
expand Medicaid." 6
Through regulations and sub-regulatory guidance, HHS has invited states
to use Medicaid for Marketplace Premium Assistance. States now have a clearly
defined option available through which they may offer Premium Assistance for
Marketplace plans as an alternative to direct Medicaid, as long as the coverage
is cost effective and beneficiaries remain eligible for all Medicaid benefits
and cost-sharing protections. HHS has also used sub-regulatory guidance to
indicate the prerequisites for approval of demonstration waivers that require
adults eligible for the Medicaid Expansion to participate in Marketplace
Premium Assistance. With HHS's framework in mind, the question remains:
how well does this comport with what is happening in Arkansas?
IV. ARKANSAS REVISITED: THE ARKANSAS MARKETPLACE
DEMONSTRATION WAIVER
On February 28, 2013, Governor Mike Beebe announced that Arkansas
had reached an "agreement in principle" with HHS to allow the State to cover
adults newly eligible for the ACAs Medicaid Expansion by using Medicaid
funds to purchase private plans offered through the State's new Health
Insurance Marketplace."' On March 26,2013, the Arkansas legislature passed
a Medicaid Expansion for adults conditioned on the State obtaining approval
from HHS to use Marketplace Premium Assistance for "low-risk adults."1 s On
August 2,2013, the State filed a demonstration waiver application with HHS
seeking a waiver of Section 1905(a) to allow the State to implement mandatory
Marketplace Premium Assistance for all Medicaid Expansion eligible adults
who are not "medically frail" or have other exceptional medical circumstances."1
On September 27, 2013, HHS approved the demonstration waiver setting
forth Special Terms and Conditions with which it must comply. 120 Arkansas
estimates that the demonstration, commonly referred to as the Private Option,
will enroll 90% of those newly eligible for Medicaid in Marketplace plans and
116 Id.
117 Div. of Med. Servs., Private Health Insurance for the Medicaid Expansion Population, ARK.
DEPARTMENT OF Hum. SERVICES, http://humanservices.arkansas.gov/dms/Pages/default.aspx
(last updated Aug. 5, 2013)-
s H.B. 1143, 89 th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013), available at www.arkansashouse.org/
public/userfiles/files/HBui4 3.pdf.
119 State of Arkansas, Section m115 Demonstration Waiver Application, Healthcare Indepen-
dence Program (Aug. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Arkansas Waiver Application], available at http://www.
medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/II5/downloads/ar/
ar-private-option-pa.pdf. For a list of specific waiver requests, see id at 30-31.
120 Letter from Marilyn Tavenner to Andy Allison, supra note 2; SPEcIAL TERMS AND CON-
DITIONS, Supra note 2.
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nearly double the size of Arkansas's new Marketplace.12'
While Arkansas'authorizing legislation goes beyond what HHS indicated it
is willing to approve via a Section 1115 demonstration waiver, the broad outlines
of the Arkansas Marketplace Demonstration Waiver fairly closely track HHS's
guidance for mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance demonstrations, at
least for year one of the demonstration. 122 Only Medicaid Expansion adults who
are not medically frail or do not have other exceptional medical circumstances
will be required to enroll in Marketplace plans.' 23 Marketplace enrollees will
have a choice of at least two Marketplace plans.124 Medicaid ABPs will be
closely aligned with Marketplace plan benefits, and Demonstration enrollees
will be entitled, at least on paper, to almost all Medicaid benefits and all cost-
sharing protections.125 According to Arkansas's projections, using Marketplace
plans will cost no more than direct Medicaid coverage. 126 The demonstration is
approved for three years, ending December 2016.127
However, questions remain about what impact the Arkansas Marketplace
demonstration will have on Arkansas' new Marketplace, on those required to
enroll in Marketplace Premium Assistance, and especially on beneficiaries who
will continue to rely on traditional Medicaid. It is unclear whether the State's
budget projections are realistic and how HHS will evaluate the demonstration.
Moving into 2014, Arkansas presents an interesting, and in many ways
enticing, landscape for the nation's first mandatory Marketplace Premium
Assistance demonstration. It is a small state with a population that tends to
be older, sicker, and poorer than the nation as a whole. 28 The private insurance
121 Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note 119, at 1o, 17.
122 See H.B. n43, 89 th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 203), available at www.arkansashouse.
org/public/userfiles/files/HBiu 43 .pdf.; Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note II9. Arkansas
states that it intends to request a waiver to require children and low income parents in mandatory
Marketplace Premium Assistance in future years. It also intends to impose additional cost-sharing
requirements in the future.
123 SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 2, at 8-9. Those who are medically frail or
have other exceptional medical circumstances will be given the option to enroll in direct Medicaid
with the state's full scope of Medicaid benefits including long term care services and supports. Id.;
Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note i9, at to.
124 SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONs, supra note 2, at 12; Arkansas Waiver Application, supra
note n9, at 18.
125 SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 2, at 13; Arkansas Waiver Application, supra
note 119, at 11-12, IS-16, 43-44. The State Medicaid agency will pay insurers' premiums and cost-
sharing subsidies using a payment system modeled after the system used to pay for federal premium
tax credits. Id. at 3, 26. The Demonstration application states that Arkansas intends to impose cost
sharing on those with incomes between 50% and 100% FPL in year two, but it also acknowledges
that the State will need an additional waiver to do so. Id. at S, 44.
126 See Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note ii9.
127 Id. at I.
128 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION BY FED-
ERAL POVERTY LEVEL, http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-fpl/ (last visited Nov.
14, 2013) (22% of the Arkansas population lives under the national poverty level, compared to the
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market has been neither vibrant nor competitive, with one insurance company
dominating the market. 2 9 The State's Medicaid program has the nation's
stingiest eligibility limits for adults, disqualifying parents who earn more than
16% of the federal poverty line and declining to cover nondisabled adults
without dependent children. 30 More than one-quarter of working age adults
in Arkansas are uninsured.'3 '
The State hopes that its mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance
demonstration will nearly double the size of the Marketplace, adding 225,000
relatively healthy adults, in an effort to attract more private insurers, increase
competition, and ultimately bring down-rather than increase-premium costs
in the Marketplace.'32 However, it is not clear how realistic Arkansas projections
are about the health status of newly eligible adults. Arkansas estimates that
only 10% of adults eligible for the ACA Medicaid Expansion will be medically
frail or have other exceptional medical circumstances excluding them from the
mandatory Marketplace Demonstration.'33 However, surveys consistently find
that about 20% of the poor and near poor uninsured report being in poor to
merely fair health;'34 and HHS, in its waiver approval, reduced the estimated
number of demonstration enrollees to 200,000, a figure more in line with the
50-state and District of Columbia average of 2o%); THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,POPULA-
TION DISTRIBUTION BY AGE, kfforg/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-age/ (last visited Nov.
14,2013) (16% of the Arkansas population is 65 years old or older, compared to 50-state and District
of Columbia average of I3%); THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,TOTAL NUMBER OF RESIDENTS,
http://kfforg/other/state-indicator/total-residents/ (last visited Nov. 14,2013) (Arkansas state pop-
ulation is 20th smallest compared to 5o-state and District of Columbia populations). See generally
THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH STATUS, http://kff.org/state-category/health-status/
(last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
129 See THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., How COMPETITIVE ARE STATE INSURANCE
MARKETS? 7 tbl.x (20II),http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/20z3/OI/8242.pdf (larg-
est insurer in individual market has 77% market share).
130 See Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note ii9, at I; THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
ADULT INCOME ELIGIBILITY LIMITS AT APPLICATION AS A PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL POVERTY
LEVEL (FPL),JAN. 2013 (2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/income-eligibility-low-in-
come-adults/.
131 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ADULTS
19-64, http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/adults-19-64/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (26% of work-
ing-age adult are without insurance).
132 See Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note ii9, at 17 and 21 (noting that the demonstra-
tion adds 225,000 people to the Marketplace, nearly doubling its size).
133 See id.
134 See KAISER COMM. ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., CHARACTERISTICS OF POOR UNINSURED ADULTS WHO FALL INTO THE COVERAGE GAP
fig.3 (Dec. 17, 203) available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.coM/2zo3/12/8 5 28-
characteristics-of-poor-uninsured-adults-who-fall-into-the-coverage-gap.pdf; KAISER COMM.
ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNIN-
SURED: A PRIMER 7-8 (Oct. 23, 2013) available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/203/io/ 7451-o 9-the-uninsured-a-primer-e28093-key-facts-about-health-insurance 4 .pdf.
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research data.'
The State has designed the demonstration as a vehicle to entice new insurers
into the Arkansas Marketplace by crafting it to allow Premium Assistance
participants to enroll in any silver-level Marketplace plan, not just the two
lowest-priced plans.136 All insurers who sell in the Arkansas Marketplace
in 2014 will be able to compete for the estimated 200,000-225,000 Private
Option enrollees.' While the State has indicated that in future years it may
more narrowly circumscribe which plans are eligible to participate in the
Private Option (possibly limiting the choices to the two least costly plans),
in 2014 Private Option enrollees can select any plan based upon the network
and coverage, not the premium price, which will be paid by the State Medicaid
agency.' The State has also designed an auto-enrollment process for Private
Option enrollees who fail to select a specific Marketplace plan, designed to help
each Marketplace plan achieve a target minimum Private Option enrollment.3 9
It is not clear how well the demonstration has succeeded in enticing new
insurers to Arkansas: four insurers will be selling in the Arkansas Marketplace,
with at least two that are new to the state.'" Of course, it is not clear yet how
Arkansas's premium pricing and plan designs will compare to other states. We
also do not know whether the new insurers who have entered the Arkansas
Marketplace also offer Medicaid managed care plans and whether those
companies would be attracted to any state implementing the ACA Medicaid
Expansion.
Another concern is how the demonstration's "full choice" of plans will
impact the overall cost of premiums in the new Marketplace: Private Option
enrollees, as many as 200,000-250,000 people, have no immediate incentive
to purchase less expensive plans and many may be auto-enrolled in higher
priced plans as part of an effort to give all issuers a share of the Private Option
enrollment. Moreover, for 2014, Marketplace premiums in Arkansas are already
above the national average: $231 per month compared to a national average of
135 SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONs, supra note 2, at I.
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 21-22. Out of pocket costs for enrollees will be the same for all plans. The State
will require enrollees to pay the maximum cost sharing allowed by federal law. If the plan's design
requires higher or other cost sharing, the costs will be paid by the State Medicaid agency. Id.
139 See id. at 27.
140 See Andrew Demillo,Arkansas PPACA ExchangeAttracts Four Carriers, LIFEHEALTHPRO
(June 5, 2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2os3/o6/o5/arkansas-ppaca-exchange-attracts-four-
carriers. In addition to Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, which has been the dominant insurer in
Arkansas, Celtic Insurance Company, QualChoice of Arkansas, and a National Blue Cross Blue
Shield multi-state plan will be selling through the Marketplace. Id. ASSISTANT SECY FOR PLAN-
NING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: HEALTH IN-
SURANCE MARKETPLACE PREMIUMS FOR 2014, at 2 (203) [hereinafter ASPE ISSUE BRIEF 1, avail-
able at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2oi3/marketplacepremiums/ib-premiumslandscape.pdf
(summarizing the options that will be available in the new Marketplaces).
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$203 per month.14'
The demonstration's "full choice" design also carries financial risks for
enrollees, which could contribute to harmful churning as enrollees' incomes
fluctuate moving them off Medicaid and into federal premium tax credit
assistance. Premium tax credits are pegged to the cost of the second-lowest cost
silver plan offered in the Marketplace in an effort to incentivize consumers to
purchase lower cost plans.142 For example, a 35-year-old living in Little Rock,
Arkansas earning $17,235 a year, 150% FPL, qualifies for a premium tax credit
of $235 per month. With that credit her (or his) share of the premium for
a silver plan ranges from $46 to $108 per month, depending on the plan.143
In contrast, Private Option Medicaid enrollees, at least in year one of the
demonstration, can pick any silver plan at no premium cost to them. Those
who enroll in-or are auto-enrolled in-higher priced silver plans through the
Medicaid Private Option, will likely suffer sticker shock if their earnings go up,
they go off Medicaid, and move into the premium tax credit pricing structure.
They may not be able or willing to pay their share of higher premiums to stay
in their old Medicaid Private Option plan, and may end up churning between
Marketplace plans as they move from Medicaid Private Option to premium
tax credits. Without careful consumer education and full disclosure, Arkansas's
"full choice" model could contribute to churning among plans and providers as
people move between Medicaid and Marketplace plans.'"
The demonstration may also undermine the traditional Medicaid program
that will continue to serve the most vulnerable: the aged, people with disabilities,
children, very poor parents, pregnant women, and newly eligible medically frail
adults. One of the State's reasons for using Marketplace Premium Assistance
is its conclusion that Arkansas Medicaid provider network is at capacity, and
unable to absorb all those newly eligible for the ACA Medicaid Expansion.145
Arkansas Medicaid physician payment rates are relatively high compared to
141 ASPE ISSUE BRIEF, Supra note 140, at 7-8 tbl.x (reporting average for the thirty-six states
using the federal Health Insurance Marketplace based on prremiums for the individual policy of
a 27-year-old).
142 See FERNANDEZ & GABE, Supra note IS, at o.
143 A bronze plan cost even less, between so and s35 per month, but those earnings below
250% FPL who purchase a silver plan also qualify for additional tax credits to reduce their cost shar-
ing for deductibles, copayments, and cost of insurance. Thus, silver priced plans are the best value
for those who qualify for cost-sharing help and the reason that the Arkansas Private Option uses
silver plans. See generally HEALTHCARE.Gov, https://www.healthcare.gov/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2014)
(providing premium and tax credit quotes).
144 The Arkansas Waiver Application notes that Arkansas has an "Any Willing Provider
Law," which requires plans to accept into its network any provider willing to accept the plan rates
and other contract terms. Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note iI9, at 46. The State seems to
assume this will mean that most plans will have extensive networks and few out-of-network pro-
viders. See, e.g., id. at a8. However, provider participation will depend upon reimbursement rates and
other requirements. It cannot be assumed that all providers will participate in all plan networks.
145 Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note 119, at 3.
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many states, but they are still lower than Medicare and commercial rates.146
While Arkansas physicians who participate in Medicaid are historically
more likley to accept new Medicaid patients than participating physicians in
other states, the new Marketplace plans may entice physicians to drop out of
Medicaid or,147 at least, decline to accept new Medicaid patients. Arkansas's
proposed Private Option program is large enough that it could destabilize the
traditional Medicaid program's provider network, making it harder for those
who continue to depend on it to find providers willing to accept their Medicaid
cards, particularly if the new Marketplace plans pay commercial rates that are
substantially higher than Medicaid fee-for-service rates.148
Those enrolled in the Private Option may also have difficulty accessing
the full scope of Medicaid benefits to which they are entitled. Arkansas is
using the discretion given states by the ACA to design a Medicaid ABP that
aligns closely with the essential health benefits offered by Marketplace plans,
reducing the need for Medicaid wrap-around services.149 HHS's Terms and
Conditions for the waiver specify that the state's traditional Medicaid fee-for-
service program must provide wrap-around benefits for most ABP services not
covered by Marketplace plans, specifically medically necessary transportation,
EPSDT for those nineteen and twenty years old, and family planning services
provided by out of network providers.'s Instead of being entitled to all FQHC
services, HHS has granted a waiver providing that Private Option enrollees will
only be guaranteed access to one Marketplace plan that includes at least one
FQHC or Rural Health Clinic in its provider network.
In authorizing Arkansas' Medicaid fee-for-service program to provide
wrap-around services for Private Option enrollees, HHS retreated from its
sub-regulatory guidance, which specified that wrap-around services would
need to be provided by Marketplace plans. This means that Private Option
146 See id. at 3, q, Decker, supra note 33, at 1183; THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
MEDICAID-TO-MEDICARE FEE INDEX, http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-to-
medicare-fee-index/ (last visited Nov. Y4, 2013) (Arkansas's Medicaid-to-Medicare physician pay-
ment rate is 79% compared to a national average of 66%).
147 See Decker, supra note 33, at u85.
148 The Budget Neutrality Worksheet that Arkansas submitted with its s Waiver
Application assumes Medicaid rates for the ACA Expansion group are the same as commercial
rates. See Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note I19, at Budget Neutrality Spreadsheet. It is un-
clear, though, whether Arkansas is actually raising rates in its fee-for-service Medicaid program,
and, if so, for which eligibility groups.
149 See Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note I19, at n1, 18-19, 42, 44-45. This alignment
reduces the need for Medicaid wrap-around services such that the only wrap-around services that
Private Option enrollees are entitled to are non-emergency transportation, EPSDT services for
those ages 19 and 2o, and family planning services provided by out of network providers. Arkansas
figures that the costs for wrap-around services will be only s8.58 per month. Id. at IS, 22,44-45. The
State plans to provide wrap-around services through the Medicaid fee-for-service program and
hopes it will be administratively feasible to provide one insurance card to access benefits through
the private plan and fee for service Medicaid wrap-around services. Id. at 28.
150 SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 2, at 12-13.
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enrollees will be issued two insurance cards, one for a Marketplace plan and
the other for Medicaid, to access covered services. Two sources of coverage
will make it more complicated for enrollees to navigate the system and again
raises the issue that enrollees may miss out on wrap-around Medicaid benefits.
Even more troublesome, the State has already indicated that Arkansas's fee-
for-service program may not have the capacity to provide the wrap-around
services that will be needed.
The demonstration also creates a substantial risk that those who are
medically frail or who have other exceptional medical circumstances and need
long term care and other services only provided by traditional Medicaid will be
incorrectly enrolled in the Private Option rather than direct Medicaid. Arkansas
plans to use a twelve-question online screening tool to identify those who are
medically frail or have exceptional health needs and are thus not eligible for
the Private Option."s' The screening tool will be administered as individuals
apply for new health insurance, either through Medicaid or the Marketplace.152
Arkansas is contracting with highly respected researchers at the University of
Michigan and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to develop
the questionnaire, but the protocol is still a work in process and, like any new
protocol, is likely to misclassify people, especially during the first year of use."s3
It is also possible that Marketplace plans will try to push anyone who is
Medicaid eligible with substantial medical needs, even those who do not meet
the definition of medically frail and who do not need additional services covered
by traditional Medicaid, into traditional Medicaid, in an effort to keep their
Marketplace premiums competitive. Marketplace plans may try to cherry pick,
enrolling only the healthiest and pushing as many Medicaid-eligible people
as possible into traditional Medicaid. In this scenario, traditional Medicaid
will function as a new high-risk pool, enrolling not only the most expensive
151 Id. at 19-20.
152 See id. at 19.
153 See id. at 41 (explaining that the questionnaire is still being developed and the refinements
likely to take place as the questionnaire is tested).The proposed screening tool, at least as described
in the Arkansas Waiver Application, may also fail to comply with the federal law definition of
those who are "medically frail."Id. (comparing the described algorithm which may be limited to
those with the top io% of costs with the regulatory definition of "medically frail," which includes
a broad array of people with complex medical conditions and is not limited to those with the top
io% of costs). The Special Terms and Conditions for the Arkansas Waiver specify that Medicaid
beneficiaries retain their Medicaid appeal rights that include, among other things, a right to appeal
a factual finding that one is not medically frail. See SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 2,
at 14 ("No waiver will be granted related to appeals."). This specification of appeal rights is signifi-
cant because the Arkansas Demonstration Waiver Application provided that individuals would not
be granted a right to a fair hearing to contest a finding that one was not medically frail but would
have a right to "request a re-determination of whether they are medically frail at any time during
the coverage year."Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note iI9, at 41. HHS does not have author-
ity under Section Inz5 to waive fair hearing due process rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
and federal Medicaid law that are designed to protect beneficiaries against factually inaccurate and
harmfil decisions. See SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 2, at I4.
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medically frail patients, but all above-average users.
Particularly troubling is a concern that Arkansas's cost estimates are
unrealistic, designed to support unsubstantiated claims of cost effectiveness
and budget neutrality rather than a realistic estimate of what the Private
Option is likely to cost compared to direct Medicaid. 15 4 The State's actuaries
apparently used the same formula to compute costs for a Medicaid Expansion
using mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance or traditional fee-for-
service Medicaid,"s importing assumptions for each type of coverage that are
simply unfounded for the other type of coverage. For traditional Medicaid,
the actuarial formula assumes Medicaid will pay provider's commercial
reimbursement rates rather than actual Medicaid or Medicare rates."s6 The
formula also assumes that traditional Medicaid will incur 20% administrative
costs, adopting the medical loss ratio allowed for Marketplace plans, rather
than the more typical 5% administrative costs reported by fee-for-service
Medicaid programs like Arkansas's."s' On the Marketplace side, the actuarial
formula computes costs based upon service utilization multiplied by commercial
provider reimbursement rates, rather than using the premium and cost-sharing
costs that will actually be charged to the state by Marketplace plans.5 s While
one might be sympathetic to HHS allowing Arkansas a little room on the
cost estimates to encourage an important demonstration to move forward,
budget neutrality and cost effectiveness calculations based upon such obviously
flawed data are likely to create a baseline against which it is impossible to track
whether the demonstration is cost effective or budget neutral compared to a
traditional Medicaid expansion.
Ultimately, the most troublesome part of the waiver approval may be that
HHS approved the demonstration before finalizing the details about how the
demonstration will be evaluated, what data will be collected, how quality and
access will be monitored, and what benchmarks will be used to judge how
well or poorly this demonstration fares.159 The Special Terms and Conditions
for the demonstration give Arkansas sixty days to submit a draft evaluation
design. It specifies that the evaluation is to address cost effectiveness, access,
quality, consumer satisfaction, and continuity of care, but leaves the details to
be negotiated with the State, after implementation of the Private Option is
154 See Arkansas Waiver Application, supra note Ir9, at 29 ("Because they could have been
made eligible without a waiver, savings are not available. As a result, the projected enrollment and
costs for the Private Option Beneficiaries are shown as identical in the without waiver and with
waiver scenarios.").
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 See id. ("non-medical load (administration and profit/risk/contingencies)").
158 See id. ("Optumas applied the commercial reimbursement anticipated to be used on the
Marketplace to the projected utilization . . . .").
159 SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 2, at 22-30.
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already underway.'6
Mandatory Marketplace Premium Assistance is an intriguing idea, but it
presents substantial risks as well as potential benefits. Without good evaluative
data-and an independent evaluator-there will be no way to determine how
well, or poorly, Arkansas's Private Option operates in practice and compares
with traditional Medicaid coverage. Neither will it be possible to evaluate
the true costs of using Marketplace plans rather than traditional Medicaid.
Without adequate interim evaluations, enrollees in the Private Option and in
traditional Medicaid may suffer from an experiment gone awry.
CONCLUSION
Arkansas' Private Option may be a game changer. It has already opened up
a new avenue for expanding Medicaid that appears more politically acceptable
to Republican lawmakers. The demonstration provides an opportunity to test
important hypotheses about the relative cost, quality, and access to health care
provided by the new Marketplaces and traditional Medicaid. As the experiment
unfolds it can provide important new information about competition in the new
Marketplaces, how to deliver services to those eligible for the ACAs Medicaid
Expansion for adults, and how to protect the nation's most vulnerable-the
aged, children, and people with disabilities-who remain eligible for traditional
Medicaid.
However, questions remain about what impact the Arkansas demonstration
will have on Arkansas' new Marketplace, on those required to enroll in
Marketplace Premium Assistance, and especially on the poorest beneficiaries
who will continue to rely on traditional Medicaid. Also yet to be determined is
whether HHS will allow Arkansas to expand the demonstration in years two
and three of the waiver, beyond the parameters set forth by its sub-regulatory
guidance, to enroll children and very low-income parents in mandatory
Marketplace Premium Assistance and to impose additional cost sharing.
The post-NFIB federalism dance has just begun. Section 1115 gives the
Secretary of HHS authority to waive certain sections of the Medicaid Act
to test new approaches to program design that further the purposes of the
Medicaid program. However, new approaches like mandatory Marketplace
Premium Assistance must be subjected to rigorous, independent evaluation to
determine how well they work and whether they do, in fact, provide quality,
accessible, and affordable care.
160 Id.
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